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By Timothy Cowen and Stephen Dnes1  
 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The growth of large online platforms around the world has led to increased attention toward 
innovation policy. Dominant platforms such as search engines and social media have led many 
to question whether innovation is being stifled and whether economic growth, particularly when 
driven by smaller companies, is being held back. Low economic growth is the issue facing many 
parts of the world and one question posed by this article is whether we can afford to take the 
risk that monopolization provides huge gains for a few while depriving many of opportunity.    
This article will place EU competition law policy in comparative perspective, drawing 
comparisons with U.S. federal antitrust law, which differs on a number of key points relating to 
innovation. As a starting point, both EU and U.S. policy and law both seek to foster innovation. 
However, they can be argued to do this in slightly different ways. For example, important EU 
precedents, such as the Microsoft decision, indicate that EU law displays a strong preference 
for fostering competition among small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) that compete to meet 
customers’ needs in many varied and dynamic ways.2 On this view, a large platform is regulated 
                                                      
1 Partner, Preiskel & Co LLP, and Stephen Dnes, Senior Consultant, Preiskel & Co and Lecturer, University of 
Dundee, Scotland. 
2 Case T-201/04 Microsoft. 
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to preserve a single market in which new product innovation at a “small feasible component 
level” is promoted and organizations providing such products can grow, leading to desirable 
goals such as new products, market integration and employment growth. Aside from the 
position taken in the law, the Commission’s appetite for competition law intervention is also 
now clearly a part of an overall Digital Single Market strategy.3 
By contrast, U.S. federal antitrust law has taken a subtly but significantly different 
approach. Increased sensitivity to critics of earlier antitrust policy led to an antitrust 
“revolution” in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, chiefly at the hands of the federal judiciary. 
Important controls over business practices such as vertical restraints, or vertical integration 
between different players in a supply chain came to be regulated far less strictly, if at all,4 and 
duties to deal with rivals were radically curtailed.5 Evidence and pleading requirements were 
heightened for those alleging anti-competitive conduct.6 Overall, great faith was placed in the 
belief in certain economic arguments that markets would be self-healing and that anti-
competitive conduct would be disciplined by larger stronger more vertically integrated players, 
rather than the law.7 These changes were an important factor in U.S. competition and 
technology policy that has created a small number of larger, often vertically integrated, players 
that run the major technology platforms and provide their own services over those platforms. 
Recent cases at the intersection of competition law and technology policy have drawn 
out important differences between the EU and U.S. In the EU, competition law and technology 
policy is not likely to be well served if it were simply to copy U.S. policy; no one in the EU is going 
to create another Google, Amazon, IBM, or Facebook platform, given the challenge of scaling 
the enormous heights of the barriers to entry that a new entrant would now face. However, 
fostering innovation and encouraging competition among SMEs can and should mean allowing 
markets to be served by both the major technology platforms and products from SMEs that can 
be supplied over such platforms. Preventing abuse by dominant vertically integrated platforms 
then becomes critical to enable innovation at the level of smaller product markets such as 
those met by applications and technology services. 
This article highlights a number of important precedents to show how EU competition 
policy fosters a competitive marketplace, before applying these points to the ongoing 
investigation into Google, whose resolution may yet prove to be the most important restatement 
of EU competition policy on digital markets. 
 
II.   COMPETITION POLICY DEBATES OVER ONLINE BUSINESS PRACTICES 
                                                      
3See also statements by the newly appointed Director General for Competition (Laitenberger) September 2015. For 
more details on the EU’s Digital Single Market policies, see http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/. 
4 For many years now, the U.S. agencies have published only Horizontal Merger Guidelines (most recently in 2010) and 
have not updated much earlier vertical guidelines, signaling that vertical merger challenges will be pursued 
comparatively rarely. 
5 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (strengthening the test for a plausible case to avoid summary 
dismissal). 
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
7 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942; reprinted 1994 London: Routledge). 
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Much of the difference between EU and U.S. competition policy towards online platforms 
reflects different positions in competition policy debates on the likelihood of competitive harm. 
In turn, the policy position applied can have a profound effect on a third party developer or 
entrant seeking access to market. The debate is especially clear in relation to the law on 
foreclosure and tying, which governs the combination of separate products by dominant 
companies, such as formerly separate online services. 
Although the law on tying shares similar basic features across many jurisdictions,8 
important interpretive differences give rise to stricter regulation of tying of online services in 
the European Union than in the United Stated. This is especially clear with regard to the 
separate products requirement in tying law. 
A.   Separate Products Requirement 
Both EU and U.S. competition law analyze whether it is truly the case that an alleged tying 
practice combines separate products; in both cases, showing that the affected products are 
not truly separate will defeat the claim.9 However, a different standard is applied by each 
system. In the United States, the leading precedent on technological tying, U.S. v. Microsoft 
Corp (“Microsoft II”), altered an otherwise somewhat stricter rule to provide significant 
deference towards technological tying.10 In this approach, separate products will only be found 
where there is no “plausible” case that combining the products leads to innovative benefits: 
“the question is not whether the integration is a net plus, but merely whether there is a 
plausible claim that it brings some advantage.”11 
Thus, the D.C. Circuit adopted a rule by which cases, in which the separate products 
requirement is even somewhat debatable, fall to be regulated chiefly by market forces. In the 
event that the market does not discipline the tying practice, it is entirely possible for it to remain 
entrenched for a significant period of time, since it will almost always be possible to arrive at 
some “plausible” case that even heavily distortive tying practices might carry some benefit. 
By contrast, EU competition law has left more discretion to competition authorities in 
assessing the separate products element of the law. In the EU’s Microsoft tying case, involving 
the tying of windows operating system with Microsoft’s Media Player, several factors suggesting 
that there might be a separate product market received significant weight, including: 
•   “The factual and technical situation that existed at the time when…the impugned 
conduct became harmful,” that is, the point at which the decision to combine the 
product is made.12 
                                                      
8 International Competition Network, Report on Tying and Bundled Discounting, June 2009 (available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc356.pdf) 
9 For the U.S. position, see Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); in the EU, see Case T-
83/91Tetra Pak v. Commission [1994] ECR II-755, upheld on appeal in Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission [1996] 
ECR I-5951 (‘Tetra Pak II’) (tying cartons and carton machinery). 
10 United States v. Microsoft Corp, 147 F3d 935 (DC Cir. 1998). 
11 Id. at 948. 
12 Microsoft at para 914. The point was repeated in the context of remedies at para 942. 
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•   The existence of a relatively small group of consumers seeking copies of Windows 
without Media Player for the workplace. 
•   Indirect evidence included aspects of the nature and features of the software, their 
historical development, the state of the market and commercial practice, such as 
the existence of independent suppliers and alternative sources of downloads.13 
•   Suspicions relating to findings of “commercial usage” in a market that might already 
be distorted by a large market share.14 
The Court also stated that a number of factors that dominant companies would be likely to 
argue would not be given significant weight. Even where a “natural link” exists between 
products, or where combining them is consistent with commercial usage, the Court stated that 
combining products can still be found abusive unless the combination is objectively justified.15 
It also expressly rejected the argument that technical integration formed part of the “normal 
and necessary,” “constant improvement” of products, instead looking to the purpose and 
technical constraints in the market which suggested that two separate products had been 
combined.16 
In summary, whereas the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had adopted a standard 
by which a plausible case of efficiencies would result in a finding of a single, new product, and 
thus no tying, the EU position differs by requiring the dominant company to objectively justify 
its position that integration should take place in circumstances where there were separate 
products in existence. The bias toward vertical integration in the U.S. system means that 
innovation at the level of smaller markets will more easily be foreclosed and restricted. The EU 
courts are, in effect, adopting a position more likely to foster innovation and growth at the level 
of smaller markets where smaller and more agile companies can provide their services. This is 
consistent with EU technology policy from the Lisbon Agenda through to the i2010 and Digital 
Single Market Strategy. It also supports and fosters SMEs to deliver economic growth in the 
European Union where such companies are the motor for innovation and employment.  
B.   The Long Shadow of the One-Monopoly-Profits Theory 
One important theoretical factor explaining some of the difference in approach seen between 
the two systems is the strong influence of the so-called “one monopoly profits” or “one 
monopoly rents” theory on U.S. antitrust law.17 The theory, which is closely associated with 
Chicago school thinkers such as Judge Robert Bork, argues that under certain conditions it 
would not be necessary to tie two products in order to gain monopoly profits. Instead, the firm 
can simply increase the price of the product for which it has market power, and make its profit 
there. 
                                                      
13 Microsoft at paras 926 to 935. 
14 Id. at para 940. 
15 Id. at para 942. See Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak II, para. 293 above, para. 37. “[E]ven when the tying of two 
products is consistent with commercial usage or when there is a natural link between the two products in question, it 
may none the less constitute abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC, unless it is objectively justified.” ( 
16 Id. at paras 935 to 937. 
17 See e.g. Blair and Kaserman, Antitrust Economics (OUP, 2009) Ch. 18 (discussing economic approaches to analysis of 
tying arrangements). 
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The claim is that monopoly rents can only be had once (“one monopoly profits”), and 
that this can be done best by anticompetitive conduct in the market where there is market 
power rather than in another one. For instance, a photocopier manufacturer might increase the 
price of copiers, rather than increase the price of tied products such as service. On the one-
rents view, an increase in service price will simply depress the sale price of the copier, resulting 
in no additional profits. 
On this view, tying the products could possibly even decrease monopoly profits were the 
practice to lower overall demand for the product – in turn suggesting that the tying practice is 
pro-competitive since the monopoly profits could simply be extracted from increasing the price 
of the product in which there is market power.  
The argument that monopoly profits exist only in a particular market casts doubt upon 
the “leverage” theory of tying, which argues that firms could use market power in one market 
to gain market power in another. For instance, the copier manufacturer might seek a monopoly 
on a separate but related service market. 
For a number of simple markets, the one-rents theory is not wholly unreasonable. 
However, the theory depends on a number of assumptions that are unlikely to hold in many 
markets, and are especially unlikely to hold in technology markets. Perhaps the most notable 
of these is that consumers have similar demand profiles. In the copier example above, the 
copier manufacturer might find tying service or consumables an effective way to identify high-
use users who value the copier more. Tying copiers and service or consumables would be a 
way to segment the market between high and low-use users, effectively charging a different 
total price to each. In this way, monopoly profits can be extracted from the high-use users 
without experiencing the loss of low-use consumers that would follow from simply increasing 
the price of the copier. Tying can thus be an effective way to extract increased rents from 
consumers, and for this reason has been repeatedly pursued by businesses over many 
decades.18  
In technology markets, the constant dynamic of new innovation creating different 
solutions to pre-existing needs means that once a position of market power is attained, the 
holder can adopt a practice of foreclosing entry that is likely to deprive it of that power. This is 
not always the case since dominant companies can adopt the opposite strategy, one of 
constant innovation in order to meet consumer needs, while at the same time ensuring that 
their approach to the market complies with the duty to compete on the merits with the products 
and services of other players.    
C.   The Limited Relevance of the One-Rents Theory in the Online Marketplace 
The one monopoly rents theory led to Judge Bork famously arguing that “analysis shows that 
every vertical restraint should be completely lawful.”19 However, there would be great danger 
in carrying over that thought into the current century from the simple markets and different 
time where it belongs. In technology markets in particular, technological tying can be a potent 
                                                      
18 See e.g. International Salt Co. v. United States 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Tetra Pak, cited above. 
19 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Free Press, 1978), 288. 
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means to create barriers to entry that foreclose rivals. For example, a dominant firm may have 
obtained market power in circumstances where there is a network externality at work; including 
circumstances where each individual additional user obtains a benefit from being a member 
of a network in which communicating with other users is valuable. Telecommunication and 
communications networks of all types often exhibit such characteristics and, where abuse of 
dominance leads to market foreclosure, competition law requires access or interoperability 
with essential inputs so that all can compete on the merits of their individual products.   
Platforms are also often operating in two-sided markets. A theory such as the one-rents 
theory relies on competition in the target market; competition is assumed to discipline 
“leveraging”. However, where entry into the target market depends on inputs from the 
dominant company, there is substantial scope for the dominant company to achieve “leverage” 
from one market to another. If online service providers rely on traffic from users of a dominant 
search engine, the decision of the dominant search engine to hinder or block traffic to them 
will deny them access to those users and access to the market. Moreover, it is likely to be 
profitable for a dominant platform to foreclose rivals in downstream product markets. Even if 
a strategy of foreclosure led to a small amount of the search engine’s advertising revenue to 
be reduced in the short term, it is likely that the effect of traffic diversion into the search 
engines’ own downstream products with different revenue and profit profiles can lead to higher 
profits for the firm overall. Put another way, if it pays to abuse a dominant position then abuse 
will occur and that is why we have laws against it. 
In more complicated markets, it seems that the one-rents theory has little to offer the 
analysis, in turn suggesting that precedents motivated by it are of limited relevance in the case 
of dominant online platforms. It is perhaps for this reason that even Judge Bork, who had so 
loudly beat the drum for the one-rents theory, argued for competition law regulation in the case 
of dominant technology platforms.20 
D.   Attention to Separate Product Requirements Masks Factors in Online Markets 
The caution of the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft is understandable to the extent that 
courts would reasonably wish to avoid getting into the position of regulating product design 
decisions.21 However, such an approach may understate important dynamics in two-sided 
technology markets. 
A two-sided market exists where demand in one market depends on demand in another. 
For instance, the demand for newspapers is an important factor driving the demand for 
advertisements in newspapers.22 Markets affected by two-sided dynamics are not new. With 
the growth in advertising funded models in internet businesses they have become prevalent in 
certain parts of the technology ecosystem, particularly in recent years. Importantly, they defy 
the market-disciplining ethos implied by analysis such as the D.C. Circuit’s “plausible efficiency” 
                                                      
20 Harry First, “Bork and Microsoft: Why Bork Was Right and What We Learn About Judging Exclusionary 
Behavior,” paper presented at Yale Law School, September 27, 2013. 
21 Microsoft, above n. 10. 
22 See e.g. Rochet and Tirole, “Two-sided markets: An overview,” discussion paper available at 
http://web.mit.edu/14.271/www/rochet_tirole.pdf. 
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standard, which is unlikely to apply satisfactorily to the more complicated dynamics of two-
sided markets. 
The nub of two-sided market analysis is the importance of considering both relevant 
markets. If competition exists across two markets, market power is likely to be a factor of the 
overall position across both. Simple examples of innovative products in simpler markets, such 
as the decision to integrate car radios and cars, are misleading in the case of a complicated 
two-sided market as they understate this dynamic. 
In the case of an online platform, the decision of the dominant operator of one side of 
the market is likely to have significant effects on market power across the combined market. 
In some two-sided markets, platform providers may have a strong incentive to attract platform 
users. A dominant payment network might, for instance, have incentives to attract card issuers 
and acquirers (although whether the incentives are optimal is of course an additional question). 
In other markets, strong incentives might exist to exclude certain platform users in favor of an 
integrated product. In the process, an important competitive fringe, composed of a range of 
companies, who are often smaller, more agile and well placed to respond to user demand, 
might be excluded. As a result, the platform provider can put monopoly provision of the 
combined services in place, at the expense of innovation and choice for consumers. 
Even if there is a case that a degree of integration of products is desirable as a matter 
of short term efficiency, it is unclear why as a matter of policy it needs to come at the expense 
of a thriving range of competitive providers of services which guarantees that consumers can 
choose between innovative service providers. The ability of smaller companies to access the 
wider market using the platform in turn allows them to reach consumers and grow, preventing 
the existence of a dominant platform from standing in the way of innovation and growth. 
 
III.   EU COMPETITION LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET 
The above discussion suggests that the more important question in a multi-sided market is the 
overall level of competition and the incentives faced by parties such as payment networks or 
search providers and platforms, as well as the competition that exists at the level of products 
services or components rather than doctrinal questions such as the line between separate and 
new products. Seen in this way, EU competition policy is to be commended in its ability to 
consider the competitive dynamics of emerging technologies in a context-sensitive way, and to 
intervene quickly to assure competition in digital marketplaces.  
The EU Commission’s enforcement record is good in this regard since it has intervened 
in a series of decisions such as the Microsoft case, the Apple Developer Guidelines case and 
the review of IBM’s bundling of maintenance and mainframes. Its intervention was swifter in 
some cases and not others, which creates serious issues for confidence and investment and 
knock on effects on whether companies will be tempted to enter and grow. The Commission’s 
ongoing investigation into Google’s abuse of dominance in online searches can safely be said 
to have gone on for far too long.  
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A.   Microsoft 
The approach of EU competition law to platform markets can be seen particularly clearly in the 
Microsoft case.23 In the course of the 1990s and 2000s, Microsoft drew antitrust scrutiny 
around the world for its software design practices, which were thought potentially to distort 
competition in certain software markets. Microsoft’s decision to combine Microsoft Windows 
and Windows Media Player into a combined package was challenged as unlawful tying of the 
two products.24 Microsoft also faced additional challenges in relation to browser choice, 
network interoperability and developer access to toolkits known as APIs.25 
The Media Player case shows that reasonably prompt competition law enforcement will 
preserve a competitive marketplace. In the late 1990s, Microsoft Windows enjoyed a market 
share over 90%, making it an indispensable platform for software developers looking to access 
the software market for personal computers. Even if Microsoft’s player was arguably not as 
advanced as those developed by others, it could be assured a certain market share by virtue 
of its visibility on every PC with Microsoft’s Windows software. The reason for intervention was 
that a company in Microsoft’s position could undermine a competitive market in media players, 
to the detriment of different media players and ultimately to the detriment of competition for 
media players in fulfilling the choices of consumers. 
Faced with such a clear potential for competitive harm, the EU courts are to be 
commended for taking a sensible and appropriate approach.  The courts took a firm position 
in favor of preserving a competitive marketplace since there was sufficient evidence that a 
separate product market had existed before the integration occurred. Indeed, the decision 
enables dominant companies to comply with their duties more easily by building a process to 
examine their actions for the effects they may have on others before taking action. This is a 
limited imposition given what is at stake. Also, since the law requires that a dominant company 
has to prove an objective justification before vertical integration takes place and that any 
justification for integration is necessary and proportionate.  
Frequently, this requires dominant companies to heed their market position where small 
steps are available that significantly decrease the scope for competitive harm, such as labeling 
their own offerings or providing competitors with platform access on reasonable terms. The 
decision is clear in its preference for a competitive marketplace as the main driver of 
innovation, rather than allowing rewards from the accretion of market power or potential 
efficiency derived from vertical integration to be owned by yesterdays’ innovators. In essence 
the decision is a victory for continuing diversity and plurality over short term claims by firms 
with market power for doubtful efficiency gains.   
B.   Apple Developer Guidelines: “There’s an App for that”, Thanks to the EU Commission. 
A similar pattern of favoring a competitive and diverse developer marketplace in the context of 
a multi-sided technology market can be seen in the European Commission’s investigation into 
                                                      
23 Microsoft n. 2 above. 
24 Microsoft n. 2 above. 
25 For an extensive analysis of the U.S. and EU cases, see Gavil and First, The Microsoft Antitrust Cases (MIT press, 
2014). 
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the Apple Developer Guidelines.26 In April 2010, Apple decided to restrict the terms and 
conditions of its license agreement with independent developers of mobile applications running 
on the iPhone operating system. This would have restricted the use of third party players which 
had allowed developers to use competing programming tools and languages when developing 
iPhone apps.27 
The case provides another example of a dominant platform provider attempting to 
leverage market power into related markets. At the time of the case, the iPhone was the 
predominant smartphone, and the apps market was in its infancy. A restriction such as Apple’s 
could easily have altered developers’ use of third party tools, as they would not have been able 
to license such applications for the iPhone. Since the iPhone became the largest market for 
many app developers, there was little scope for competitive switching to discipline the market. 
The conditions were ripe for leveraging market power in handsets and operating systems into 
related applications markets. 
The Commission’s decision to launch a prompt investigation and precipitate a rapid 
change in Apple’s terms and conditions is to be applauded. The case was resolved less than 
six months after the change, before lasting damage to the marketplace had occurred. Apple 
dropped the change to its terms and conditions, paving the way for the competitive app 
marketplace seen today. It could be said that the wide range and peculiar diversity of apps for 
myriads of user needs is a direct result of the Commission’s swift action.28 The success of this 
lesser-noted case might serve as a lesson for future investigations about the importance of 
promptly resolving competitive harm before it becomes entrenched. 
C.   IBM 
In the same year as the Apple investigation, the Commission instigated an investigation into 
IBM concerning its alleged abuse of dominance in the mainframe maintenance market. The 
allegation was that IBM held a dominant position in legacy mainframe computers, bundled its 
mainframes with its own maintenance and hindered access to critical spare parts, potentially 
distorting competition in the market for independent players. Although the case took somewhat 
longer, being resolved only by December 2011, the Commission achieved a significant victory 
in preventing the leverage of market power from one market to another, related market, in a 
reasonable time frame. 
The economic importance of the case is often overlooked. Mainframe computers 
perform mission-critical business processes, which demand a very high level of reliability. They 
are used by major companies and governments for computing that needs to be highly 
dependable such as billing, benefits systems and tax collection. Maintenance can be 
performed by smaller players. A healthy market for third party maintenance providers (“TPMs”) 
can exist, limiting market power that might otherwise arise, and if it did would be likely to allow 
                                                      
26 European Commission, Antitrust: Statement on Apple's iPhone policy changes, Press release of September 25, 
2010. 
27 The case also concerned restrictions to warranty policies, which Apple also agreed to alter. See European 
Commission Press Release, n. 26 above. 
28 See European Commission Press Release, n. 26 above. 
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significant extraction of consumer surplus by segmenting different groups with different 
demand profiles. IBM had adopted a number of business practices which struck at the heart 
of these independent service organizations. 
First, IBM began to restrict TPM access to IBM spare parts while continuing to provide 
its own repairers with access. Until November 2002, TPMs enjoyed the same 24/7 access to 
spare parts as IBM engineers. From November 2002, however, TPM spare part access was 
restricted to normal business hours. 
Secondly, certain crucial spare parts (stand-alone processor books) could only be 
bought from IBM and were subject to an exchange-only policy. The exchange-only policy 
required that the defective spare part be returned to IBM within 48 hours of delivery. Before 
October 2009, if TPMs failed to meet the deadline or failed to return the part altogether – 
referred to as a non-return – a much higher non-exchange price was applied to the part. From 
October 2009, a non-exchange price was charged for non-returns and a 3 percent daily fee 
applied for late returns. Depending on the series, model and configuration of the Mainframe, 
the non-exchange price could be up to 4139 percent higher than the exchange price. 
Thirdly, IBM appeared to have unreasonably delayed access and withheld information 
on the existence of Machine Code Updates. This threatened TPMs’ ability to provide their 
customers with adequate answers to technical issues. 
The three restrictions constituted a direct threat to the existence of an independent 
market for mainframe maintenance. Applying a similar concern to preserve competition in 
related markets, and to prevent leverage of market power, the Commission resolved the case 
in December 2011 through a set of commitments accepted under Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003. The commitments require IBM to make spare parts and technical information swiftly 
available, under commercially reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to independent 
mainframe maintainers. The commitments acted swiftly to allow smaller players to operate and 
to preserve competition that might otherwise have been eliminated by market power in a 
related market. 
D.   Reuters Instrument Codes 
The same enforcement pattern can be seen in the Commission’s investigation into restrictions 
relating to Thomson Reuters Instrument codes (“RICs”) used to run financial software.29 RICs 
identify a particular security and are embedded into financial software. As a result, there is the 
opportunity to undermine the scope to switch away from RICs to competing providers of real-
time data, as expensive and sensitive trading systems would require an extensive redesign. 
The Commission’s decision was to allow third party developers to handle RICs. This is to be 
welcomed to the extent that it will allow market power from RICs’ embedded status in a variety 
of software to be addressed in much the same way as third party access to parts was critical 
in the case of IBM mainframes. Unlike the IBM case, the commitments stop short of allowing 
                                                      
29 Case AT.29654 – Reuters Instrument Codes. 
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direct third party handling of RICs, a point which has been much debated and is currently being 
litigated.30 
E.   Google 
The same issues arise with the Commission’s longstanding, high-profile investigations into the 
search giant Google. Google provides search and a number of related services, with a European 
market share that has persisted over many years at over 90 percent. It also supplies the mobile 
operating system Android, which currently has an estimated 68 percent market share in 
Europe.31 
Just as third party access to spare parts proved critical in the IBM case, a range of 
innovative online service providers depend on search traffic from Google. Some have joked 
that “the best place to hide a dead body is page two of the Google search results,” a slightly 
glib expression of the seismic impact Google’s search engine rankings have on the success, or 
failure of online businesses.32  It is not just online service providers that are affected by 
Google’s dominance in online searches. The vast and growing “search engine optimization” 
industry bears witness to the importance of the rankings for many ordinary brick and mortar 
businesses. In a world where most internet users rely on Google to point them to online 
resources, it is critical to be on the first page of search results. Google has, in effect, amassed 
substantial power over what users may see online and controls access to many businesses. 
Such power is not, in itself, illegal under EU competition law, which distinguishes 
amassing market power from its abuse.33 This is in line with the theory that success in business 
should not be penalized and indeed that innovation should receive reward. However, special 
duties arise in the case of the successful business that has become dominant since that 
position may then stifle innovation. The law seeks to ensure that further entry is not foreclosed, 
so that the crown for success in the competitive race can be passed from one successful firm 
to another, preventing firms from winning by killing off the competition. Dominant companies 
must have due regard to their impact on the competitive market structure. An analogy can be 
drawn between this duty and duties of care in tort law, which seek to promote risk-bearers to 
take cost-effective steps to minimize the social cost of their risky activities.34 Companies such 
as Google are required under EU law to objectively justify their positions taking actions that 
adversely impact on others’ and take a proportionate approach to potential market distortions 
arising from the way that they run their businesses. 
                                                      
30 Case Case T-76/14 Morningstar. 
31 Android Switchers Drive iOS Growth in Europe's Big Five, Kantar World Panel, May 6, 2015 (available at 
http://www.kantarworldpanel.com/global/News/Android-Switchers-Drive-iOS-Growth-in-Europes-Big-Five-
Countries). 
32 Chad Pollitt, “The Best Place to Hide a Dead Body is Page Two of Google,” Huffington Post, April 18, 2014 
(available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chad-pollitt/the-best-place-to-hide-a-_b_5168714.html). 
33 Article 102 TFEU refers to “abuse of a dominant position,” not its creation, unlike Section 2 of the U.S. Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890, which forbids “monopolization” but not necessarily the exploitation of market power already 
accrued. 
34 See e.g. Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (Pearson, 2011), ch. 6. 
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The ongoing EU Commission investigation now approaching its fifth anniversary 
concerns allegations that Google has failed to fulfil this duty. The main allegations concern 
Google’s alleged self-promotion of search results, favoring its own specialized (“vertical”) 
search services, and the misappropriation of third party content, such as reviews.35 These 
practices undermine competition in related markets where Google is present, such as online 
shopping, news, images, weather, videos and maps. They undermine investment in third party 
products, which a third party provider knows is likely to be undermined if it falls foul of search 
result manipulation or content misappropriation. Google has taken steps to integrate formerly 
disparate products in much the same manner as was condemned by the European Commission 
and the Court in the Microsoft/Windows Media Player case. The investigation could well 
conclude that Google did not heed the important duties placed on dominant companies by EU 
law to consider, and to carefully review its actions on an objective and evidenced basis before 
adopting any form of integration and proportionately ensuring that it avoided competitive harm 
from integrating separate products into its dominant platform. 
Alongside the search investigation, an additional investigation into Google’s Android 
operating system was opened in April 2015. The investigation will assess whether Google has 
adopted similar practices in relation to its Android operating system to hinder development and 
market access for rival operating systems, communications applications and mobile services. 
The main allegations turn on alleged exclusive pre-installation, software modification and tying 
practices aimed at distorting competition, by leveraging power in the operating system into 
other, related markets. It would also be open to the Commission for it to consider that the 
embedding of Google’s dominant search engine in Android and provision of both search and 
operating system software free of charge was designed to extend Google’s dominance 
originally established in the search engine used in PC’s to other more portable computer 
devices, reserving to itself a series of separate but related markets in the process.  
Both investigations are ongoing, and it remains to be seen how they will be resolved. At 
the time of writing, the Android investigation was at a relatively early stage, whereas the search 
investigation appeared to be moving towards a prohibition decision, and a likely fine.  
Remedies are a particular issue in technology markets and addressed fully in a seminal 
article by the small group of EU officials at the center of enforcement in many of these cases. 
In an influential article on remedies following the Microsoft cases, these officials stated: 
In its 2004 decision, the Commission found that Microsoft had abused its 
dominant position in PC operating systems by (1) refusing to supply 
interoperability information necessary for competitors to be able to effectively 
compete in the workgroup server operating system market; and (2) tying its 
Windows 
Media Player with Windows. The decision ordered Microsoft to disclose the 
information that it had refused to supply and to allow its use for the development 
                                                      
35 The investigation also considers restrictions on switching in advertising markets. See e.g. Press Release “Antitrust: 
Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address competition concerns”, April 25, 2013 
(describing the case in the context of commitments proposals, which were rejected). 
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of compatible products. The disclosure order was limited to interface 
specifications (not source code) and to ensuring interoperability with the 
essential features that define a typical workgroup network. It applied not only to 
the complainant Sun, but to any undertaking that had an interest in developing 
workgroup server operating systems. 
The conditions under which Microsoft makes these disclosures have to be 
reasonable and non-discriminatory. Microsoft may require a reasonable and non-
discriminatory remuneration for the production of the documentation, as well as 
for specific intellectual property rights that the Commission’s decision might 
prevent it from fully enforcing against beneficiaries of the order to supply 
(provided that Microsoft could establish that these specific intellectual property 
rights are valid in the EEA).  With respect to tying, the decision ordered Microsoft 
to provide a version of Windows that did not include Windows Media Player.36 
Although it is still developing, the Android case might follow a similar remedial approach.  There 
will no doubt be difficulties in defining the scope of the decision and with the ability to ensure 
that it cannot be bypassed by technological means. It is to be hoped that the lessons learned 
from Microsoft and other cases are borne in mind in the current case. It is refreshing to know 
that the current EU Commissioner for Competition has made clear her concern about the 
effects of Google’s actions and appetite for an increase in enforcement efforts by sending 
Google a statement of objections in April 2015.37 
It is very much hoped that the EU Commission will follow the pattern of its earlier 
practice and send a clear signal to dominant companies that they cannot simply promote and 
display their own products at the expense of competition. Taking an effective decision would 
help to promote a competitive online marketplace, and the Commission would be enforcing the 
rules for all on an equal basis. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
This article has surveyed recent cases concerning EU competition law enforcement efforts in 
technology markets, with reference to a few cases and policy initiatives. The record shows that 
the European Union has developed a consistent and principled approach to enforcement that 
should promote innovation. It will affect all businesses that use technology and promises to 
ensure that agile and innovative smaller and medium sized technology enterprises will prosper. 
                                                      
36 See for more detail on remedies Per Hellstrom and others, “Remedies in European Antitrust Law” 76 Antitrust 
Law Journal No 1 2009. Per Hellstrom is Head of Unit for Antitrust: IT, Internet and Consumer Electronics for the 
European Commission’s Directorate General Competition. Frank Maier-Rigaud is a Senior Economist for the Energy 
and Environment Directorate for the European Commission’s Directorate General Competition and is affiliated with 
both the Department of Economics, University of Bonn (Germany) and the Max Planck Institute for Research on 
Collective Goods (Bonn, Germany). Friedrich Wenzel Bulst is an Attorney in the IT, Internet and Consumer 
Electronics Unit for the European Commission’s Directorate General Competition.    
37 Margrethe Vestager, “Competition policy in the EU: Outlook and recent developments in antitrust,” speech 
delivered at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 16, 2015. 
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In this, EU policy differs from U.S. policy, resulting in the emergence of a small number of very 
large vertically integrated platforms in the United States. 
Despite the differences considered above in the law and policy objectives applied by the 
two jurisdictions, it should be recalled that prosecutorial discretion would enable a more 
consistent approach to be achieved, given sufficient political will. There appears to have been 
a strongly arguable case against Google’s search bias even under U.S. law. In March 2015, one 
of several FTC staff reports into Google’s alleged search practices was leaked, and appears to 
have found serious concerns about search manipulation.38 Although the politically appointed 
Commissioners acting at the FTC ultimately decided not to pursue a case, too much can be 
made of these differences in legal points since they would be much less important if 
prosecutorial discretion were to change. That is something that may change with the prevailing 
political wind.  
As the final stages of the long-standing EU investigation into Google approach, an 
opportunity arises for the European Union to apply the same principled position in favor of 
innovation as seen in previous cases and to ensure that the playing field is level for all. It is 
only by such enforcement that dominant platforms can be prevented from substantially 
distorting competition in related markets, ensuring access for innovative players with much to 
offer a world needing their products and services and an economy in need of increased 
economic growth. 
 
                                                      
38 B. Mullins, R. Winkler and B. Kendall, “Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of Google,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 
2015. Curiously, only alternate pages of the report were leaked. 
